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Post Trauma: Cambodian Refugees and
Social Security's Disability Fraud
Investigations
THEODORE MCCOMBS*

Introduction
At age 17, S.A. witnessed her brother's execution by Khmer
Rouge soldiers: They bound his hands and threw him off a cliff.1
After escaping Cambodia and spending four years in a Thai refugee
camp, S.A. came to the United States on an asylum visa in the 1980s.
But her troubled emotional state prevented her from learning
English or gaining any employment. S.A. began seeing a therapist
for her depression and recurring nightmares of her brother's death.
Her therapist diagnosed S.A. with severe Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder ("PTSD"), and she applied for disability benefits.
Cooperative Disability Investigations ("CDI"), an investigative unit
under the Social Security Administration, pulled S.A.'s claim for
investigation. CDI had previously flagged S.A.'s therapist as a
fraud risk for her repeated PTSD diagnoses. Although S.A.'s
examining doctors never diagnosed malingering (lying about a
disability), and although CDI investigators never alleged any fraud,
the analyst rejected S.A.'s credibility and denied her claim. Three
years and two appeals later, an administrative law judge reversed
the analyst's decision, rejected the investigators' report, and
2
awarded S.A. disability benefits.
* J.D., 2008 University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; B.A., 2005, UC San
Diego. The author would like to thank Lisa Lunsford and the attorneys, staff, interns,
and clients at the Homeless Action Center for their inspiration and example. He also
extends his appreciation to Prof. Anne Joseph O'Connell, Jaime Hernandez, and the
editors at the Hastings Race and Poverty Law Journal for their help preparing this note.
1. All initials represent actual clients of the Homeless Action Center whose
identities have been disguised to protect their privacy. No initials correspond to the
client's name.
2. S.A. A.L.J. Decision (on file with Homeless Action Center). See infra note 33.
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S.A.'s story is far from unique. Since 2003, the CDI unit for
Oakland, California, has investigated at least twenty-nine
Cambodian disability benefits applicants, all refugees at one point
treated by S.A.'s therapist. 3 In at least twenty-four of these cases, no
examining doctors had diagnosed malingering; rather, the
therapist's name had triggered the investigation.
These
investigations led to a rejection at the initial application stage,
though they rarely accused the applicant of fraud and were often
dismissed years later at the appeal stage. The pattern of these
investigations reveal broad, institutional flaws in Social Security
programs and policies, which severely prejudice the claims of these
refugee applicants and other vulnerable classes.
This note explores and evaluates these flaws through a case
study of thirteen Cambodian refugee applicants investigated by the
Oakland, California CDI unit. Part I provides an introduction to
Social Security disability benefits and the Cooperative Disability
Investigations program, and briefly develops these thirteen
applicants' cases. Part II examines the disadvantages to traumatized
Cambodian refugee applicants created by the CDI program. Parts
III, IV, and V evaluate these disadvantages under three different
legal theories, respectively: national origin discrimination, disability
discrimination, and due process.
This note concludes with
proposed changes to the CDI program that would mitigate these
disadvantages while concurrently respecting CDI's mission.
I. Background
Before turning to these Cambodian refugee applicants' stories,
one must first understand the context within which one finds them.
The following Part expounds briefly upon the mechanics of Social
Security and the cultural forces surrounding Cambodian refugees,
welfare fraud, and the Cooperative Disability Investigations antifraud program.
A. Cambodian Refugees in America
The Cambodian refugee community suffers from extremely
high rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") and Major
Depression due to traumatic experiences during the Khmer Rouge
regime. From 1975 to 1979, the Khmer Rouge massacred as many as
3. Lonny Shavelson, The World: Cambodian Refugees and the Social Security
Administration (BBC radio broadcast Nov. 28, 2006), available at http://www.
photowords.com/radio/Cambodian.htm.
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two million Cambodians out of a population of seven million. 4 One
million more died in the civil wars preceding and following the
Khmer Rouge regime. 5 Many refugees to the United States arrived
only after years in crowded refugee camps on the ThailandCambodia border, where sub-standard and even dangerous living
conditions were the norm. 6 In a National Institute of Mental Health
("NIMH") study of a Cambodian refugee community in California,
99 percent reported having experienced near-death due to
starvation, 96 percent reported forced labor, 90 percent reported
having a family member or friend who had been murdered, and 54
percent reported experiencing torture. 7 The NIMH study reported
62 percent suffered from PTSD, and 51 percent suffered from Major
Depression.8 In sharp contrast, the rates of these disorders among
the general American population are 3 percent and 10 percent,
respectively. 9 The Cambodian refugees reported severe symptoms
of these disorders as many as two decades after resettlement in the
United States. 10 These conditions substantially hampered the
refugee subjects' adjustment to their new life: A majority of subjects
could not speak English even after twenty years in the United States;
69 percent lived below the federal poverty line, and 72 percent were
currently receiving some form of government assistance.11
In the late 1990s, a series of high profile busts of fraud rings run
by and for Cambodian refugees helped foment the growing push for
welfare restrictions for immigrants. These rings typically involved a
corrupt Southeast Asian translator or social worker who, for a
sizeable kickback, coached refugees in faking disabilities, invented
traumatic histories, and succeeded in obtaining disability benefits

4. Grant Marshall et al., Mental Health of Cambodian Refugees 2 Decades After
Resettlement in the United States, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 571, 572 (2005).
5. Id.
6. James Boehnlein & J. David Kinzie, Psychiatric Treatment of Southeast Asian
Refugees, 6 (1) NAT'L CTR. FOR PTSD CLINICAL Q., 19, 19 (1996), available at http://www.
ncptsd.va.gov/ncmain/nc-archives/clnc-qtly/V6N1.pdf?opm=1&rr=rr1056&srt=d&ec
horr=true.
7. Marshall, supra note 4, at 575.
8. Id. Other studies record different, but still quite high prevalence rates for PTSD
and Major Depression. See Richard Mollica & Laura McDonald, Old Stereotypes, New
Realities: Refugees and Mental Health, 39 (2) U. N. CHRON. 29 (2002) (37 percent and 68
percent, respectively), available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue2/
0202p 29 refugees.and-mentalhealth.html; William H. Sack, et al., The Khmer Adolescent
Project: Epidemiological Findings in Two Generations of Cambodian Refugees, 182 (7) J.
NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 387, 390-91 (1996) (finding rates of 40% PTSD and 32%
Major Depression in adolescents, 58% and 23% in mothers, and 33% and 14% in fathers).
9. Mollica & McDonald, supra note 8.
10. Marshall, supra note 4, at 578; Sack, supra note 8, at 392.
11. Marshall, supra note 4, at 575.
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for them, at an overall cost of millions to the government. 12 Several
newspapers reported these busts in sensational, strongly antiimmigrant and anti-welfare language. For example, one headline
ran: "America's Most Wanted Welfare Plan: Immigrants Walk Off
the Boat and onto [the] Disability Rolls." 13 These reports of abuse
by immigrants, as well as the substantial number of immigrants
receiving
government
assistance,
provided
impetus
for
Congressional legislation restricting immigrant access to
government assistance. 14
B. Cooperative Disability Investigations
The Cooperative Disability Investigations ("CDI") units are a
project of the Social Security Administration's Office of the Inspector
General ("OIG"), designed to combat fraudulent awards under
Social Security's means-tested disability benefits program,
Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Since 1998, reports from the
federal government's General Accounting Office ("GAO") starkly
criticized the SSI program's vulnerability to fraud, particularly its
vulnerability to fraudulent "middlemen," such as translators, who
could exploit SSA's lack of bilingual staff. 15 The pressure from these
reports prompted OIG to create the CDI units, which coordinate the
efforts of CDI special agents, SSA and state Disability Determination
Services ("DDS") staff, and law enforcement agencies to gather
evidence in suspicious cases. 16 CDI teams do not typically develop
evidence for the criminal prosecution of fraud; rather, OIG insists
that their primary mission is to gather evidence so that the DDS
analyst may make an accurate disability determination in suspicious

12. See, e.g., Putsata Reang, Cracking the Case of Welfare Fraud, SEATTLE TIMES, June 1,
1998, at Al; Leslie Brown, State Employee Arrested in Fraud, Bribery Scheme, MORNING
NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Apr. 13, 1995, at B1.
13. Jim Haner & John B. O'Donnell, BALT. SUN, Jan. 24, 1995, at 1A; see also Michelle
Malkin, DSHS Doesn't Seem to Mind Welfare Fraud by Immigrants, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 6,
1998, at B4; Elaine Porterfield, Man Who Taught Refugees How to Bilk Government Convicted
of Mail Fraud, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), June 6, 1998, at B4; Editorial,
Millions Defrauded From SSI, HARRISBURG PATRIOT & EVENING NEWS (Pa.), Sept. 6, 1995,

at A6.
14. See Lanelle Polen, Salvaging a Safety Net: Modifying the Bar to Supplemental Security
Income for Legal Aliens, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1455, 1463-66 (1998); Bill Ong Hing, Don't Give
Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories and Welfare Reform, 33 HARV.
CIv.R.-Civ.L. L. REV. 159, 168 (1998).
15. See Office of the Inspector General, Social Security Administration, Eye on OIG,
Oct. 2005, http://www.ssa.gov/oig/communications/eyeonoig/eyeoiglOO52005.htm
(last visited Mar. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Eye on OIG].
16. Id.
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cases. 17 CDI agents investigate individual disability claimants and
middlemen (such as translators, doctors, lawyers, or claimant
representatives) suspected of fraud. These agents may gather
information typically unavailable to DDS analysts, through hidden
surveillance of claimants and unannounced, often deceptive
interviews with the claimants and their neighbors.18 Currently,
there are nineteen CDI units in seventeen states. 19
CDI units have had an enormous impact on the SSI program,
though the nature of this impact is questionable. From July 1999 to
July 2005, CDI Reports of Investigation ("ROIs") have been used to
support over eight thousand denials, which has saved the federal
government about $492 million. 20 However, an OIG audit revealed
that, of the 907 ROI-supported denials appealed to administrative
law judges ("ALJs"), the ALJs reversed 526, or 58 percent. 21 While
most ALJs found the evidence in the ROIs helpful, and although
OIG concluded that clerical errors regarding the ROIs may have
contributed to the reversal rate, the audit observed that ALJs will
disregard evidence in the ROIs they consider to be hearsay.
Additionally, the audit revealed that some ALJs had requested CDI
units to justify their statements, limit their ROIs strictly to factual
observations, and provide proper context for their statements. 22
Presumably, then, a substantial number of ALJ reversals resulted
not simply from clerical errors, but actual disagreements with the
conduct and conclusions of the CDI investigations.

17. GEN. AcCT. OFF., SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
NEEDED TO REDUCE PROGRAM VULNERABILITY TO FRAUD AND ABUSE, REPORT TO THE
HONORABLE HENRY A. WAXMAN 11 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1999/he99151.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT TO REP. WAXMAN]; OFF. INSPECTOR
GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: THE REALITIES WE FACE:
CONTINUITY AMID CHANGE 22 (Apr. 1, 2004-Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.
ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/sar042004102004.pdf [hereinafter OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT,
FALL 2004].

18. Position Paper: Expansion of the Cooperative Disability Investigations Units, NAT'L
ASS'N DISABILITY EXAMINERS, July 1, 2004, at 1-2, available at http://www.nade.org/
CDI Position PaperJuly_2004.doc (follow July 1, 2004 hyperlink) [hereinafter NADE

Position Paper].
19. Eye on 0IG, supra note 15. There are two CDI units in California, one in Oakland
and the other in Los Angeles. Id.
20. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
REVERSAL OF DISABILITY DENIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION
FROM COOPERATIVE DISABILITY INVESTIGATIONS UNITS AUDIT REPORT, AUDIT REPORT A07-05-15091, 2 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/oig/ADOBEPDF/A-07-05-

15091.pdf [hereinafter OIG AUDIT REPORT].
21. Id. at 3. The audit reported 4,712 total ROI-supported denials from July 1999 to
April 2004, out of which only 907 nationwide were appealed to an administrative law

judge.
22. Id.
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C. The Disability Determination Process
The Supplemental Security Income program provides financial
assistance to persons with a severe, medically determinable, mental
or physical disability, below a certain resource limit. 23 An applicant
submits an initial SSI application to a local Social Security office,
which, after various preliminary screenings, forwards the
application to a state-operated DDS. 24 The DDS analysts decide the
initial application based on medical evidence solicited from the
claimant's medical providers, as well as the claimant's work history
and other lay evidence, such as daily functioning reports filled out
by the claimant and/or her family. 25 If the analyst finds insufficient
medical evidence in the file to decide the claim, he will order a
Consultative Examination, in which an independent doctor
examines the claimant at the state's cost. 26 At this point, the analyst
may refer the claim to a local CDI unit, or the CDI unit may, as part
of an ongoing investigation, pull the case itself. The analyst weighs
the evidence and decides whether the claimant has a disability
under the federal Social Security Act, the numerous federal
regulations promulgated by the Social Security Commissioner, and
the Program Operations Manual System ("POMS"'), a set of agency
guidelines for analysts. 27
If the analyst rejects an initial application, the claimant has the
option to request a de novo reconsideration of her claim by a
different DDS analyst. 28 If the second analyst similarly rejects the
claim, the claimant may request a hearing before a local
administrative law judge. The next appellate levels are a systemwide Appeals Council, and then federal district court. 29 While DDS
analysts rarely or never meet the claimant, the ALJ hearing is faceto-face, non-adversarial, and provides for limited, quasi-judicial

23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1382c(a)(3)(B) (2008).
24. HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES §§ 1:2, 1:8

(St. Paul: West Group 5th ed. 1998); SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BOARD, DISABILITY DECISION
MAKING: DATA & MATERIALS 101 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter DISABILITY DECISION MAKING],

availableat http://ssab.gov/Publications/Disability/chartbook2.pdf.
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, at § 1:8; DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra note 24,
at 101.
26. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, at § 8:94.
27. The POMS do not have the force of law, nor do they bind SSA, but they are
"persuasive authority." See, e.g., Stroup v. Barnart, 327 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2003); Knott
v. Barnhart, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2003).
28. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, at § 1:8.
29. Id., DISABILITY DECISION MAKING, supra note 24, at 102-103. These appellate
levels are open only to claimants, never to SSA seeking to reverse claimant-favorable
decisions.
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D. Case Studies
This note explores the CDI program's interaction with
Cambodian refugees with PTSD and Depression through thirteen
case studies in the Oakland/Berkeley area in Northern California.
During the summer of 2006, I worked at the Homeless Action
Center ("HAC"), a non-profit organization providing legal
representation to SSI claimants with mental disabilities. Since 2003,
HAC has represented thirteen of at least twenty-nine Cambodian
refugees who had applied for SSI and been targeted for
investigation because of their association with a CDI-flagged
medical provider. In all twenty-nine cases, CDI investigations
resulted in an initial denial. ALJs have reversed at least sixteen such
denials. 31 While thirteen case studies cannot speak for the entire
CDI program, 32 these investigations reveal several institutional
disadvantages for traumatized Cambodian refugees, and reveal
profound shortcomings in the CDI program.
Each CDI investigation follows a particular cycle: the state DDS
analyst refers a suspicious claim to the Oakland CDI unit; the unit
decides to investigate the claim, conducts whatever investigation it
deems appropriate, and files a Report of Investigation ("ROI") with
the analyst; the analyst weighs the ROI against the other evidence in
the file, and; in each of the twenty-nine Cambodian refugee cases,
denies the claim.
1.

Common Triggers

In each of the thirteen case study investigations, analysts
referred the claimant to CDI at least in part because of his or her
association with B.L., a licensed family therapist with a Ph.D. in

30. GEN. ACCT. OFF., SSA DISABILITY REDESIGN: MORE TESTING NEEDED TO ASSESS
FEASIBILITY OF NEW CLAIM MANAGER POSITION, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY, GAO/HEHS-96-170, 11-12 (Sept. 27, 1996), available
at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?HEHS-96-170;

DISABILITY DECISION MAKING,

supra note 24, at 102-03.
31. Eight of the thirteen claimants represented by HAC, and eight of sixteen
represented by other non-profit claimant representatives, have successfully appealed
initial denials or terminations.
32. Due to SSI applications' confidentiality, I study only the thirteen applicants
represented by HAC during my internship. Since HAC does not select its clients
according to any qualities of their cases, but only according to its attorneys' caseloads,
one may safely assert that the thirteen cases are sufficiently representative of the twentynine refugee CDI-investigated applicants.
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Psychology, who specializes in refugee mental health. Through a
community support project, Dr. B.L. treats a large number of
Cambodian refugees, and frequently provides her treatment notes,
when requested, to the DDS analysts who review her patients' SSI
claims. CDI has flagged Dr. B.L.'s patients for referral primarily
because of "a pattern wherein most patients are assigned the same
diagnoses of Major Depression and [PTSD], often relating to
traumatic experiences 20 or more years past in Cambodia."33 This
rationale accords with POMS' analyst guidelines, which regard
same or similar medical findings for different claimants from the
same provider as suspicious. 34 In several cases, DDS analysts
referred claims for review because the claimant had family members
who were also receiving disability benefits, and claimed similar
impairments, again in accordance with POMS' guidelines.3 5 Finally,
analysts also noted "inconsistencies" in the applicants' evidence,
often relating to their work history or daily functioning.36
2.

The Investigation

The typical CDI investigation involved hidden surveillance,
various records checks, "ruse" interviews, and surprise visits to the
claimant's home. CDI agents secretly followed claimants to medical
examinations or other errands to observe the claimant's functional
performance. "Ruse" interviews involved CDI agents pretending,
for example, to take door-to-door traffic surveys, and testing the
claimant's language abilities.3 7 CDI agents also asked claimants'
neighbors for their opinions of claimants' functioning, and whether
or not claimant had a disability. 38 CDI agents often visited the
claimant's home unannounced, identified themselves as federal
agents, and questioned the applicant without legal representation
33. N.C. Report of Investigation (on file with Homeless Action Center). All Reports
of Investigations ("ROIs") cited hereinafter are on file with the Homeless Action Center,
3126 Shattuck Ave., Berkeley, CA 94705, http://www.homelessactioncenter.org.
34. POMS DI § 23025.010(E)(3), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf
(follow "POMS Table of Contents" hyperlink; then follow "DI- Disability Insurance"
hyperlink; then follow "DI 230: Special Issues" hyperlink; then follow "DI 23025.010:
Identifying Cases That May Be High Risk for Fraud or Similar Fault (FSF)" hyperlink).
35. Q.R. ROI; M.S. ROI; see also POMS DI § 232025.010(D)(5).
36. E.g., N.C. ROI; U.Q. ROI; T.J. ROI; L.B. ROI; L.L. ROI.
37. E.g., D.J. ROI; see also Alan Bernstein, Social Security Unit Uses Lies to Find Fraud/
Advocates of Disability Decry 'Ruse' Tactics, Hous. CHRON., March 2, 2003, at 1 (detailing
ruse police interviews that pretend to investigate claimants for a fake crime); National
Organization of Social Security Claimant Representatives ("NOSSCR"), Handling a
"CDI" Case at the Hearing Level, 23 (10) SOC. SEC. F. 6 (Oct. 2001) (noting CDI's use of
sham Consultative Examinations for the sole purpose of claimant surveillance).
38. E.g., F.R. ROI; L.B. ROI.
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39
and sometimes without a translator.
CDI investigations paid particular attention to the reports of
Consultative Examinations ("CEs"), in which DDS provides for a
medical examination of the claimant. Analysts usually order CEs
when there is insufficient medical evidence in the file; 40 CEs have
particular utility when the credibility of a medical provider is in
question, since the state examiners are seen as a reliably neutral and
credible source. In the refugee case studies, the CEs were often
cursory, and failed to evaluate the claimant for PTSD or Major
Depression. 41 In most cases, the Examiner tested for malingering
(lying about a disability) using the Rey-15 Memory Test, a common
test for malingering and/or memory impairments. 42 The refugee
claimants often scored extremely low on the Rey test, which CDI
43
agents interpreted as evidence of malingering.
The ROIs summarized the results of these investigations and,
while falling short of alleging any actual fraud or similar fault,
implied as much through emphasis and innuendo, arranging the
evidence in contradictions that ranged from the material to the
highly artificial. 44 One
ROI noted particularly that the claimant was
"stylishly dressed." 45
In another case, the claimant denied
performing mechanical work on the cars parked behind his
residence, and stated he only picked up after the mechanics, but
"investigators observed grease under the Subject's fingernails." 46 At
the same time, ROIs reported material contradictions in several
cases, e.g., the claimant reported no work history in the U.S. but told
investigators otherwise. 47 These insinuations often allowed CDI
investigators to bias the analyst towards denial, without providing
enough credible evidence to justify an actual allegation of fraud.
The ROls also reveal a bewildering insensitivity, both human
and cultural. One investigator reported, "the Subject began to cry to

39. E.g., F.R. ROI; S.A. ROI; N.C. ROI; L.L. ROI.
40. MCCORMICK, supra note 24, at § 8:94.
41. E.g., L.B. Consultative Examination ("CE") Report (on file with Homeless Action
Center); D.J. CE Report; S.A. CE Report.
42. See

MURIEL

D.

LEZAK,

NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL

ASSESSMENT

802

(Oxford

University Press 3d ed. 1995); see also infra note 65 and accompanying text for further
discussion.
43. E.g., N.C. ROI; T.J. ROI; Q.R. ROI; U.Q. CE Report.
44. One administrative law judge remarked, in finding a particular ROI to have no
probative value, that "rather than offering any clear and convincing reason to doubt the
claimant's credibility, or the credibility of the treating sources, the report tenders
nothing but innuendo, non-sequiturs, and uneducated assumptions."
N.C. A.L.J.
Decision (on file with Homeless Action Center) (internal quotes omitted).
45. S.A. ROL.
46. N.C ROT.
47. Id.; see also S.A. ROI; U.Q. ROI; M.S. ROI; T.J. ROI; L.L. ROT.
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the extent that one might say he was bawling," yet at the end of his
48
report stated, "He did not appear to be in any pain or discomfort."
Similarly, another report described the claimant's imprisonment in a
slave labor camp as, "She quit working when she was taken custody by
the Khmer Rouge." 49 Another ROI recounted "The Subject...
to
stated in clear English, 'No speak English,"' and relied on this
50
English.
speaking
not
about
lied
had
claimant
the
insinuate that
Finally, the ROIs suggest a level of bias in the agents'
investigations, independent of their cultural insensitivity. Agents
have been quick to exaggerate superficial contradictions or medical
For example, under the heading
reports suggesting fraud.
"Malingered at Consultative Exam," one ROI cited the Examiner as
concluding, "[claimant's] performance was consistent with
'malingering,'" when what the Examiner actually said was
"[claimant's] impressions were consistent with a Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder and Malingering." 51 Similarly, another ROI justified
investigating Dr. B.L.'s patients because "many times other
examining doctors diagnosed malingering while [Dr. B.L.] had
diagnosed PTSD and Major Depression," 52 when in fact this has
happened only twice, out of twenty-six previously investigated
cases. 53 CDI agents also reported their own one-hour lay diagnoses
of the claimant, e.g., "Subject did not appear to have any mental or
54
physical ailments."
3.

Denial and Appeal

In all twenty-nine investigated cases, the DDS analyst denied
applicants' initial claims or terminated existing benefits. So far, at
least sixteen out of twenty-one completed administrative appeals
have reversed these denials. The ALJs who approved these claims
alternatively rebutted, discounted, or simply disregarded the ROIs.
Nationally, OIG reports that, from 1998-2004, CDI units received
9,300 allegations of fraud (though it is unclear whether each
allegation was investigated) and caused 5,000 claims to be denied or
terminated. 55 This translates to a 54 percent national denial rate for
CDI-investigated claims. OIG also reports a 58 percent reversal rate

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

T.J. ROI.
L.L. ROI (emphasis added).
S.A. ROI.
Q.R. ROI.
N.C. ROI.
N.C. CDI Referral (on file with Homeless Action Center).
U.Q. ROI; see also M.S. ROI; T.J. ROI; N.C. ROI.
NADE Position Paper,supra note 18, at 1.
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56
for CDI-supported denials at the ALJ appellate level.
The difference in denial rates for CDI-investigated claims,
between the national 54-percent rate and the case studies' 100percent rate, and in ALJ reversal rates, 58 percent and 76 percent,
raises several uneasy questions. Is the Oakland CDI unit especially
effective in their anti-fraud investigations, or is there something
damning about being a Cambodian refugee patient diagnosed by
Dr. B. L.? Has invidious discrimination entered into the calculations
somewhere or are the denials and dubious ROIs an unfortunate
byproduct of an imperfect, but necessary anti-fraud machinery?
The next Parts address these questions, focusing less on individual
wrongs and wrongdoers, and more on the institutional vulnerability
of SSA and the CDI program to such wrongs, and the legal
consequence of this vulnerability.

II. The Disadvantage to Cambodian Refugees
The following Part examines three classes of disadvantages the
CDI program creates for Cambodian refugee applicants. The first
class, institutional disadvantages, includes policies and practices of
CDI units and state DDS analysts that tilt the system against
Cambodian refugee SSI applicants. The second class, judgment
deficiencies, involve individual "bad choices" made by CDI agents
and DDS analysts, which reveal the system's vulnerability to such
choices. The third subpart examines the concrete harms to refugee
applicants.
A. Institutional Disadvantages
Firstly, and perhaps most conspicuously, the triggers identified
in the POMS as "high risk" indicators of fraud make DDS analysts
more likely to refer Cambodian refugees to the CDI unit. For
example, POMS DI § 23025.010 flags situations in which several
applicants, assisted by a common "middleman," claim similar
impairments, especially "PTSD, anxiety, and depression." 57 But
given the extraordinary prevalence of PTSD and Major Depression
among Cambodian refugees, this means that a set of Cambodian
refugee applicants who, for example, use the same translator to fill
out their SSI applications,58 will very likely fall under suspicion.
56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
57. POMS DI § 23025.010(E)(2).
58. This is not an uncommon situation, given the high rates of illiteracy (in English
and often in Khmer) among Cambodian refugees, as well as the volume of forms
required in an SSI application. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 575.
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Similarly, the POMS considers situations in which the claimant's
family or household members also receive disability benefits as
possible high fraud risks; 59 correspondingly, one ROI observed, "It
obviously appears unusual for two close family members to be
suffering from severe mental problems and the Subject herself is
alleging the same." 60 But again, PTSD and Depression's high
prevalence among Cambodian refugees indicates that it is not
unusual at all for entire families to suffer deeply from the same
shared traumas.
The POMS "high risk indicators" also cast suspicion on the
community organizations and professionals that serve the
Cambodian refugee community, leading to unwarranted
investigative referrals of their patients. The POMS cautions against
medical reports provided by a middleman that "are from the same
source(s) as for others assisted by the middleman, and findings are
similar or identical." 61 However, a mental health professional who
treats Cambodian refugees in significant numbers, or who, like Dr.
B.L., specializes in refugee mental health, will very likely diagnose
PTSD and Depression in many of her patients. Given the correlation
between mental impairment and poverty within the refugee
community, 62 a responsible professional who makes such diagnoses
will likely recommend applying for SSI.63 If so, the applicant will
likely need assistance filling out the SSI claim forms; 64 i.e., he will
If this middleman specially serves the
need a "middleman."
Cambodian refugee community - as would a Khmer translator, or
a Licensed Clinical Social Worder ("LCSW") affiliated with a
refugee community organization - then we arrive at the precise
"suspicious" situation cited above: A middleman providing DDS
with medical reports from the same source with similar or identical
findings. While stated hypothetically, the above model perfectly
describes several non-profit mental health organizations in the
Oakland/Berkeley area, which combine translators, social workers,
and mental health professionals to serve refugees, Cambodians,
and/or the greater Asian community. It also exactly describes the
pattern of investigative referrals for the twenty-nine Cambodian
59. POMS DI § 23025.010(D)(5).
60. Q.R. ROI.
61. POMS DI § 23025.010(E)(3).
62. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 575.
63. Such a recommendation would respond appropriately to Axis IV, Psychosocial
and Environmental Problems, which include "inadequate social support," "insufficient
welfare support," unemployment, and "extreme poverty." See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 29 (4th ed. 1994)

[hereinafter DSM-IV].
64. See Marshall, supra note 4, at 575.
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refugee SSI applicants.
The standards and tests commonly employed in fraud
investigations further disadvantage traumatized applicants from
Cambodian refugee communities.
Notably, the Rey 15-Item
Memorization Test's utility as a malingering indicator depends on
the subject's familiarity with Western symbols. The Rey test gives
the subject ten seconds to memorize "fifteen symbols." In reality,
these fifteen symbols are just five 1-2-3 sequences in different
symbol sets (A-B-C, i-ii-iii, ,I 1,111, etc.), with each triple on its
own line.
The crux of the test is that it sounds difficult
(remembering fifteen items in ten seconds) when it is in fact easy
(remembering five versions of the same sequence). The malingerer
will perform poorly because he consciously or unconsciously
believes he should, while the genuine subject will score average or
moderately low. 65 But a Cambodian illiterate who cannot read or
speak English will not recognize that "A-B-C" is the same sequence
as "1-2-3" or "i-ii-iii," and will spend ten seconds trying to
memorize unfamiliar shapes. The test becomes as hard as it sounds,
which destroys its usefulness as a malingering test. As one
Examiner administering the Rey test to a Cambodian refugee
applicant observed, "the culture-free tests that we use do not really
transcend the test-taking set which people in the Western culture
have." 66 Similarly, the "basic questions" used by Examiners and
CDI agents to test malingering (such as "Who is President?" 67) are
only "basic" for a claimant sufficiently integrated in American or
Western culture.
More fundamentally, the CDI investigators' strict standards of
consistency, 68 whether material or not, represent an extremely
difficult test for any sufferer of PTSD and/or Depression, especially
one with poor English ability. Confusion and memory loss are
symptomatic of both PTSD and Depression, 69 and claimants
suffering these impairments will likely confuse dates, omit work
history, and/or provide inconsistent information to examiners,
analysts, and investigators. For example, one claimant, when asked
by CDI agents why she could not work, pointed to her hand; due to
her PTSD, she believed the Khmer Rouge had shot her hand, though
65. LEZAK, supra note 42, at 802.
66. N.C. C.E. Report.
67. S.A. ROI.
68. See also POMS DI § 23025.010(D)(7) (stating that unresolved inconsistencies in a
claimant's evidence are high-risk fraud indicators); Id. at § 23025.010(G)(4) (stating that
reports containing inconsistent family history and other non-medical information should
be evaluated for fraud); Id. at § 23025.010(H)(1)(b) (stating that mental impairment
claims with conflicting daily functioning information may be high fraud risk).
69. DSM-IV, supra note 63, at 322, 425.

HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5

in fact the hand was physically undamaged. 70 Additionally, where
CDI agents fail to provide translators to limited-English claimants,
and rely either on the applicant's family member or an over-thephone translator service, the risk of confusion is significantly
amplified. Southeast Asian cultural perceptions of mental illness
may also interfere with a claimant's ability to describe her
impairments accurately, at least according to Western medical
standards. 71 All these factors indicate that CDI will very likely
encounter some inconsistency in cases involving traumatized
Cambodian refugees.
Finally, the institutional character of the anti-fraud program
disadvantages these applicants. For example, the POMS warns
against "impairments in which self-serving statements by an
applicant may play a more important role in evaluating severity,"
which are "particularly prevalent" in fraudulent claims. 72 PTSD
and Depression are just such impairments, since their associated
symptoms - flashbacks, nightmares, a marked loss of interest in
activities, guilty/worthless feelings, and suicidal thoughts 73 - are
necessarily self-reported. The anti-fraud machinery tends to treat
applicants' ambivalent reactions to the application/ investigation
process as fraud indicators, rather than symptoms of trauma and
disability. The POMS - and CDI agents in the field - particularly
scrutinize claimants who cooperate poorly, such as those who
"appear to be totally detached from the surroundings and have no
interest in the application process." 74 But this rather astutely
describes a severely depressed claimant with anhedonia, a marked
loss of interest in most activities. Failure to appear at scheduled
appointments without sufficient explanation may also raise
suspicion, 75 though the claimant's depression, anxiety, poor
memory, or other functional impairments may have prevented him
70. Matthew Hui, Denying Cambodians Social Security Benefits, HARDBOILED: THE
ASIAN-AMERICAN NEWSMAGAZINE (Berkeley, Cal.), Nov. 2005, at 12 (on file with
author).
71. See generally WEN-SHING TSENG, HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL PSYCHIATRY
(Academic Press 2001); ANNE FADIMAN, THE SPIRIT CATCHES YOU AND You FALL DOWN:
A HMONG CHILD, HER AMERICAN DOCTORS, AND THE COLLISION OF TWO CULTURES

(Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 1997) (describing the difficult interactions between an
immigrant Hmong family and Californian doctors in treating an epileptic daughter).
72. POMS DI § 23025.010(H).
73. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings"), §§ 12.04, 12.06
(2008) (standard evaluative criteria for Depression and PTSD).
74. POMS DI § 23025.010(E)(4). While the section cautions analysts to evaluate
whether any mental impairment may be responsible for the claimant's poor cooperation,
such a consideration has been noticeably absent from any of the thirteen case studies of
Cambodian refugee applicants.
75. POMS DI §§ 23025.010(E)(5), (F)(3).
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from appearing or phoning in an acceptable excuse. The very
involvement of government agents may further evoke traumatic
memories of Khmer Rouge persecution, 76 and cause the claimant to
answer too confusedly, passively, or evasively to convey an accurate
picture of her impairment and/or credibility.
B. Discretion and Judgment Deficiencies
Much of the perceived injustice at work in these case studies
arises from actions that, while not clearly erroneous or unjustifiable,
are still in some real sense bad decisions. Professor Jerry Mashaw, a
scholar of administrative law at Yale Law School, terms these poor
exercises of discretion as "judgment deficiencies." 77 Because SSA's
anti-fraud program necessarily allows DDS analysts and CDI agents
broad discretion in referring and investigating applicants, these
applicants are incredibly vulnerable to the prejudices, poor
perceptions, and sloppy thinking that may affect a given analyst or
agent's judgment.
The Social Security program's contradictory mandate, often
described as "cautious benevolence," 78 allows DDS analysts
substantial discretion in referring 'suspicious' claims. For example,
suppose an applicant alleging memory loss, has given contradictory
statements regarding her work history. The POMS indicates that
such conflicting evidence may be a high-risk fraud indicator, but
simultaneously cautions that at applicant's impairment may explain
the contradiction. 79 This guideline incorporates directly competing
policies: (1) an urgent mandate to root out fraud, and (2) a
paternalistic mandate to account for the claimant's impairments.
The result leaves the analyst perfectly justified (under the POMS) to
decide either way: either refer the claimant to CDI (one never can be
too careful about fraud), or find that the contradiction represents
only a memory lapse (one has to help those who can't help
themselves). Given the history of governmental pressure to crack
down on fraud,80 some analysts may feel pressured to assume the
76. See Shavelson, supra note 3; see also infra Part II.C.
77. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS

150 (Yale University Press 1983).
78. Id. at 35.
79. POMS DI § 23025.010(D)(7).
80. See generally GAO REPORT TO REP. WAXMAN, supra note 17; Supplemental Security

Income: Long-Standing Problems Put Program at Risk for Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security Issues, Health, Education, and Human
Services Division, General Accounting Office), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgibin/ getrpt?GAO/T-HEHS-97-88.
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worst and refer suspicious cases even when they see a reasonable
explanation.
Such pressure may explain why analysts have
continued to refer Dr. B.L.'s patients even after HAC formally
presented to analysts about PTSD prevalence among Cambodian
refugees.81
The CDI program's vulnerability to judgment deficiencies arises
in part from its lack of a socially accountable mission. Somewhat
counterintuitively, the CDI's mission is not primarily to bust fraud
rings and arrest fraudulent applicants, but to "gather evidence" so
82
that DDS analysts may make an accurate disability determination.
CDI agents thus have no responsibility to accuse or exonerate the
claimants they investigate, or to hold their evidence to any standard
of admissibility or, frankly, reliability. Thus, an ROI may report
superficial contradictions in the evidence, potentially prejudiced
testimony from uninformed third parties, 83 and the agent's own lay
diagnoses of the claimant's psychological impairments. 84 Such
statements, despite their own unreliability, may prove extremely
damaging to the claimant's credibility, and carry significant
persuasive appeal coming from a federal anti-fraud "special agent."
CDI's lack of accountability necessarily taints the analysts'
evaluation of investigated claims to the claimant's disadvantage.
The CDI program's generous investigative discretion further
permits its agents to disregard cultural barriers, the nature of mental
impairment, and even Social Security's own evaluative standards in
collecting and reporting evidence. Indeed, one judge, reversing an
initial denial based on a CDI report, remarked that the ROI was
"unprofessional" and revealed "at best ignorance of and at worst
indifference to the cultural realities of Cambodian refugees and
refugee mental health." 85 CDI agents have displayed marked
suspicion regarding claimants' limited English abilities and the
81. HOMELESS ACTION CENTER ET AL., POLICY REPORT: A CALL FOR HEIGHTENED
PROTECTION OF MENTALLY DISABLED CLAIMANTS IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION'S FRAUD
REFERRAL PROCESS AND COOPERATIVE
DISABILITY

INVESTIGATIONS 2-3 (Sept. 22, 2005) (on file with HAC). Several ROIs indicate that the
Oakland CDI unit may also have started investigating cases involving Dr. B.L. with or
without previous DDS referral. See, e.g., L.B. ROI; Q.R. ROI; S.A. ROI; T.J. ROI.
82. See supra text accompanying note 17.
83. For example, one CDI investigation "was instigated by the claimant's ex-wife
following a bitterly contested divorce and that her statements were being taken as fact
by the [CDI] agent." NOSSCR, Dealingwith the Office of Inspector General, 27 (1) SOC. SEC.
F. 13 (Jan. 2005).
84. Lay diagnoses, i.e., the conclusions of an observer untrained in mental
impairments, are likely to suffer from everyday stereotypes and misperceptions about
disability and especially mental illness. See MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:

CASES AND MATERIALS (Carolina Academic Press 1999).
85. N.C. A.L.J. Decision.
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86
prevalence of PTSD and Depression among claimant families.
Similarly,
the
ROIs'
preoccupation
with functional
'contradictions' - claimant can drive a car, shop for groceries, count
change, etc. - reflect an inattention to Social Security's standards,
since these activities do not necessarily contradict a disability
claim. 87 Daily functioning relates only secondarily to SSI eligibility;
the crucial question is whether the claimant can work, and a thirtyminute errand requires far less functional ability than an eight-hour
workday.88
The very tactics employed by CDI show the same indifference
to the realities of mental disability. PTSD and Depression are not
impairments typically observable through hidden surveillance or a
one-hour interview. Thus, when an ROI states that a claimant
"doesn't appear to have any ailments,"8 9 one may well ask whether
the agent understands the disorder she is supposed to be
investigating. But as one investigator remarks, the CDI program is
not interested in following medical or psychological standards:

We're not psychiatrists, we're not medical doctors, we're federal
investigators, so, when you get a fraud investigation, you look at
everything and you go where it takes you. 90
This lack of responsible investigative standards makes
investigated claimants vulnerable to CDI agents who, for whatever
reason, misunderstand the behavioral effects of PTSD or
Depression, fail to take into account cultural, linguistic, or abilityrelated factors, or report unreliable and prejudicial evidence.
Finally, the DDS analyst's discretion in deciding CDIinvestigated claims fails to protect claimants from judgment
deficiencies. Analysts may officially disregard evidence if, by a
preponderance of the evidence, they find "reason to believe" that
such evidence involves fraud or similar fault. 91 But there is no such
86. See supra Part I.D.2; Part II.A.
87. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (2008) (basic definition of disability as inability to perform
substantial gainful activity).
88. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he mere fact that a
plaintiff has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, driving a car,
or limited walking for exercise, does not in any way detract from her credibility as to her
overall disability. One does not need to be 'utterly incapacitated' in order to be
disabled.").
89. See supra text accompanying note 48.
90. Shavelson, supra note 3.
91. Soc. SEC. ADMIN, TITLES II & XVI: EVALUATION OF CLAIMS INVOLVING THE ISSUE
OF "SIMILAR FAULT" IN THE PROVIDING OF EVIDENCE, POLICY INTERPRETATION RULING,

SSR 00-2p (2000), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OPHome/rulings/oasi/33/SSR2000
-02-oasi-33.html; POMS DI § 23025.025(C)(3).
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evidentiary standard for unofficially disregarding evidence and
denying the claim: even if an analyst fails to find the "reason to
believe" standard satisfied, "factors nevertheless may exist that
justify giving that evidence less weight ... [e.g.,] because of
92
questions about the credibility or accuracy of the evidence."
Whether one calls it "fraud or similar fault" or "questions about
the credibility," the result for the claimant is, functionally, the same.
Usually, disability adjudicators must give "controlling weight" to
well-documented medical opinions from the claimant's treating
source. 93 Yet an ROI allows DDS analysts to circumvent this
standard by citing an "inconsistency... with other substantial
evidence in the case record," 94 however artificial and unreliable that
inconsistency may be. The ROI thus effectively negates the
claimant-friendly rules of weighing evidence, and submits claimants
to the relatively unregulated discretion of the analyst.
C. Denial and Psychological Harm
In all of the twenty-nine Cambodian refugee SSI claims
investigated by the Alameda County CDI unit, the DDS analyst
denied the initial application. While such unanimity does not reflect
the national rate of denial for CDI-investigated claims, claimant
representatives nevertheless feel that "once OIG is involved, the
claimant[] cannot possibly salvage the situation." 95 A denial of the
initial application creates significant impairments for the applicant's
quality of life. Appeals can take years, leaving claimants with little
resource. The retroactivity of AL-approved benefits does little to
eradicate these months or years of desperation. 96
A fraud
investigation also exposes claimants, if prosecuted and convicted for
fraud, to fines and possible deportation. 97
92. POMS DI § 23025.025(C)(1)(b).
93. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2) (2008).
94. POMS DI § 24515.004(B)(2).
95. NOSSCR, supra note 83, at 12.
96. This may explain why, nationwide, only 37 percent of CDI-investigated
applicants appealed their denials to the administrative hearing level. See OIG AUDIT
REPORT, supra note 20, at Annex B, 2. Some claimant representatives suggest that the
CDI investigation itself has a chilling effect on claimants' decision to appeal. See
NOSSCR, SSA Stepping Up Its "Anti-Fraud"Program, 22 (12) Soc. SEC. F. 6 (Dec. 2000).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-9(1) (2007) (civil monetary penalties up to $5,000 for false or
misleading statements in applying for SSI); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2007) (offenses
involving fraud or deceit with a loss in excess of $10,000 are aggravated felonies); 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2007) (aggravated felonies are deportable offenses); accord
Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding welfare fraud is an
aggravated felony, and thus a deportable offense, where the loss to government exceeds
$10,000).
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For Cambodian refugees in particular, experiencing a CDI
investigation can be "psychological torture."98 The tactics employed
by CDI - surveillance from unmarked vans, unannounced home
visits, interviews with neighbors - may evoke traumatic memories
of the refugees' imprisonment, enslavement, and torture at the
hands of their former government. Indeed, one claimant related
that "in Cambodia, such actions were followed by imprisonment,
and death." 99 These tactics may also aggravate the claimant's PTSD,
causing hypervigilance, paranoia, and fear. 100 One treating source
reports that "[s]ince these investigations started, all the symptoms
came back: nightmares, flashbacks, panic attacks; their homes don't
feel safe anymore." 101 One claimant reportedly became so upset
that "he did not even feel comfortable in his own home anymore
02
and wanted to commit suicide and kill his whole family."1
The above section analyzes the disadvantages to Cambodian
refugees in a legally neutral light. Many may reasonably argue that,
while unfortunate, these disadvantages are a necessary evil of the
anti-fraud program; after all, fraud rings have exploited the same
cultural, linguistic, and functional barriers cited earlier to cheat the
system. The next sections explore how administrative, statutory,
and constitutional law addresses these disadvantages, and whether
there is a legitimate way to balance the refugees' social and
dignitary rights against the government's anti-fraud interest.
III. National Origin Discrimination
This Part evaluates the disadvantages discussed above
according to the various legal and normative theories of national
origin discrimination, under which a public agency may not
discriminate against its beneficiaries according to characteristics
associated with national origin. Specifically, this section examines
three distinguishable models of national origin discrimination:
language accommodation; disparate impact discrimination; and
animus against aliens with disabilities.
A. Language Accommodation as Non-Discrimination
Courts and federal agencies alike recognize that language is
often an essential characteristic of national origin, and that policies
98. Shavelson, supra note 3.
99. Id.

100. Hui, supra note 70.
101. Shavelson, supra note 3.
102. Hui, supra note 70.
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disadvantaging persons of limited English proficiency ("LEP") can
constitute national origin discrimination.1 03 Accordingly, President
Clinton, in passing Executive Order No. 13166, acknowledged a
duty, deriving from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, to ensure
"'meaningful[] access" to federally funded programs and services.10 4
Under this and similar half-legal, half-administrative standards, CDI
agents have the duty first, to recognize language barriers, and
second, to develop investigative approaches that reasonably
accommodate them.
Federal and state courts, and the Social Security Administration
itself, acknowledge a responsibility to recognize linguistic barriers
in investigations and proceedings. In United States v. Guerrero, the
Eight Circuit affirmed a motion to suppress evidence obtained in a
search of an LEP defendant's car because "it [was] clear that a
reasonable officer would have been aware that Guerrero was having
difficulty understanding [the officer's] questions" and thus did not
knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search.105 Federal and
state courts similarly evaluate the extent to which language barriers
may interfere with the justice of their own proceedings. 106 Finally,
the POMS obliges SSA staff to "[b]e alert to the language needs" of
claimants, and provide interpreters "when it is evident that
language assistance is required to ensure that the individual is not
disadvantaged, even if the individual does not request an
interpreter."

107

President Clinton's Executive Order No. 13166 imposed an
obligation on all federally supported programs to develop policies
to provide meaningful access to their services for LEP individuals.108
For SSA, this means, in part, providing competent translators to LEP

103. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (2008) (EEOC regulations finding Speak-English-only
policies presumptively discriminatory); Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d 296, 298 (9th
Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, C.J., dissenting) (rejecting the Court's denial of rehearing en banc)
("Language is intimately tied to national origin"); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th
Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that, for LEP persons," language might well be an immutable
characteristic" tied to national origin).
104. 66 Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000) (still in effect); but see Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (finding that Title VI prohibits "only intentional
discrimination").
105. 374 F.3d 584, 589 (8th Cir.2004); accord United States v. Benitez-Arreguin, 973
F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 1992).
106. Richard Cole & Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and the Courts in
Addressing Foreign Language and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal
Proceeding, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 193, 198 (1997).
107. POMS DI §§ 23040.001(C)(2), (4); POMS GN §§ 00203.011(C)(1), (3).
108. 66 Fed. Reg. 50121; see also U.S. Department of Justice, "National Origin
Discrimination Against Person with Limited English Proficiency," 65 Fed. Reg. 50123,
50124-25 (Aug. 16, 2001) [hereinafter "DOJ Guidelines"].
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claimants. 09 The use of family members, especially minor children,
to translate is inappropriate, since these "untrained 'interpreter[s]'
[are] often unable to understand the concepts or official terminology
[they] are asked to interpret or translate,"" 0 and because "the LEP
client would naturally be reluctant to disclose or discuss intimate
details of personal and family life in front of his or her child" or
other close relative."'
The Oakland CDI unit's repeated indifference to cultural
barriers 112 and its repeated use of claimants' untrained family
members as interpreters" 3 indicate that its practices have fallen
short of federal standards.11 4 While the POMS' standards for
interpreters demonstrate a commitment to provide LEP claimants
with meaningful access, it appears that more training and
monitoring may be necessary to align CDI investigative units with
this commitment. Moreover, the Oakland CDI agents' hostility
towards third-party translators, 15s and their entrenched skepticism
of Cambodian refugee claimants' limited English proficiency, n 6 are
inconsistent with a "meaningful access" policy and SSA's
commitment to LEP non-discrimination.
Given past examples of Cambodian refugee fraud rings and
their exploitation of cultural and linguistic barriers (including thirdparty translator fraud), CDI agents may feel justified in their
skepticism. If so, CDI's policy of disregarding cultural and
linguistic barriers 117 is exactly the wrong approach to take. Given
the limitations of translated interrogation, and Southeast Asians'
different cultural perceptions regarding mental disability,"l8 cultural
109. POMS DI §§ 23040.001(A), (B)(2); see also Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 106,
at 194, 196 (explaining the duty of courts to provide competent translators to LEP
defendants).
110. U.S. Department of Labor, Policy Guidance on the Prohibition Against National
Origin Discrimination as it Affects persons with Limited English Proficiency, 66 Fed.
Reg. 4596, 4597 (Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter "DOL Guidelines"]; POMS DI § 23040.001(E)
(5).
111. DOL Guidelines, supra note 110, at 4597.
112. See supra Parts II.A, B.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 39, 71.
114. The use of family members to interpret is especially strange, given CDI's use of
professional over-the-phone translation services in other cases, see L.B. ROI; M.S. ROI
(suggesting that resource limitations alone cannot explain this practice).
115. See M.S. ROI (concluding, without citing any evidence, and in spite of the
claimant's statement that her non-profit translator had never implicitly or explicitly
asked for payment, that claimant would probably pay kickbacks to the translator).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 86.
117. See Michele Marcucci, Refugees Denying Fraud Charges, OAKLAND TRIB. (Cal.), Jan.
22, 2007, availableat http://www.insidebayarea.com/search/ci-5056754?IADID=Searchwww.insidebayarea.com-www.insidebayarea.com.
118. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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and language differences will present substantial barriers to
accurate information gathering. 119 If CDI's mission is indeed to
improve the accuracy of disability determinations, then agents
should seek to understand and adjust for these barriers, not ignore
them. Otherwise, these Cambodian refugee applicants may well
and rightfully describe the CDI investigation as a "Kafkaesque
spectre of an incomprehensible ritual, which may terminate in
punishment." 120
B. Disparate Impact as National Origin Discrimination
The Social Security Administration's anti-fraud machinery
further raises institutional barriers to Cambodian refugee applicants
that likely constitute disparate impact discrimination under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 "Virtually every executive
agency" has promulgated regulations forbidding "criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination." 122 The Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS"), the agency which oversaw Social Security
programs until 1995, has promulgated just such regulations, 123 as
has the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), 124 "the principal federal
agency for coordinating Title VI requirements," 125 and every major
federal
benefits
program
targeted
towards
vulnerable
populations - including Medicaid (under HHS), JobCorps
(Department of Labor ("DOL")), the Bureau of Indian Affairs
119. See Cole & Maslow-Armand, supra note 106, at 196.
120. See United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1973) (basing defendant's
right to an interpreter on her right against such a proceeding); see also Cole & MaslowArmand, supra note 106, at 200 (describing potential confusion and anxiety of LEP
subject interrogated in English).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d forbids federal programs from excluding persons from services
and benefits on the basis of national origin. While the Court has found this provision to
forbid only intentional discrimination, it "assumes" that Title VI authorizes the cited
federal regulations against disparate impact discrimination. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 28082.
122. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 108, at 50123. For the paradigmatic case on disparate
impact national origin discrimination, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 564 (1973) (finding
discrimination in the San Francisco public school system's failure to accommodate LEP
children of Chinese immigrants).
123. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3 (2008).
124. 29 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2008).
125. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 496 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). The Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh
Circuit's decision solely on the ground that federal regulations promulgated under Title
VI did not create any private cause of action, and declined to rule on the lower court's
finding of disparate impact discrimination. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 279, 293. Accordingly,
I cite Sandoval v. Hagan only on this latter issue.
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(Department of the Interior("DOI")), and all programs under the
Departments of Veterans Affairs ("VA"'), Education, and Housing
2
and Urban Development ("HUD").1 6
Since becoming an independent agency, however, SSA has not
forbidden disparate impact discrimination in its services, but
instead declares elusively, "we do not give inappropriate
consideration to your race, color, national origin, [etc.]." 127
Apparently, then, SSA has not prohibited itself from utilizing
criteria or methods of administration that, in their effects,
discriminate on the basis of national origin. First and foremost, the
Social Security Commissioner must correct this discomfiting
deviation from the standards set by like federal agencies and by
executive order. The Commissioner must likewise affirmatively
forbid disparate impact discrimination in Social Security programs,
even if she declines to provide a private cause of action against the
Administration to enforce such a provision.
Judging SSA's anti-fraud program by these normative
standards, there are two "criteria or methods of administration" that
have an adverse and disproportionate impact on the case-study
Cambodian refugees as a class. 128 First, and most concretely, the
Rey 15-Item Memory Test 129 disproportionately exposes many of
these refugees, and other persons illiterate in Western alphabets, to
false positives for malingering. Such a false positive substantially
prejudices applicants' SSI claims, as CDI agents will likely cite the
results of the test as a strong fraud indicator, probably leading to an
initial denial and possible prosecution for fraud. 130
Second, the Oakland CDI agents' marked skepticism of
applicants' limited English abilities reveals a curious double bind.
The SSI application paperwork forces claimants to state either that
they speak English, or that they speak no English at all. 131
126. See supra note 123 (HHS); 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(b)(2) (DOL); 43 C.F.R. § 17.3(b)(2)
(DOI); 38 C.F.R. § 18.3(b)(2) (VA); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (Dept. of Ed.); 24 C.F.R. §
1.4(b)(2)(i) (HUD); but see 13 C.F.R. § 112.3(b)(1)(v) (2008) (scope of Small Business
Administration's anti-discrimination regulations restricted to disparate treatment).
127. 20 C.F.R. § 405.30 (2008).
128. Cf. Hagan, 197 F.3d at 508 ("To prove disparate impact, a plaintiff must
demonstrate three essential elements: first, a facially neutral policy casts an effect a
statutorily-protected group; second, the effect is adverse; and finally, the effect is
disproportionate.") (citing Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Ed., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407
(1993)).
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. Hagan, 197 F.3d at 510 (affirming the district court's finding that a driving test
given only in English screened out LEP individuals, and therefore constituted national
origin discrimination).
131. Social Security Administration, Online Adult Disability and Work History
Report, https://s044a90.ssa.gov/apps6z/i3369/eeOO1-fe.jsp (follow "Start the Report"
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Claimants with limited English abilities - even severely limited
abilities - must choose between receiving all notices and interviews
in a language they, for all intents and purposes, do not understand,
or exposing themselves to accusations of fraud when they
demonstrate a de minimus knowledge of English: for example, when
they say to investigators, "No speak English."1 32 This method of
administration thus represents another false positive which
disproportionately affects LEP applicants' claims on the basis of
language, and constructively, national origin.
C. Exclusion and Animus against Aliens with Disabilities
Finally, these Cambodian refugee applicants may find
themselves unlucky participants in America's long-standing
discrimination against immigrants with disabilities. Put bluntly,
CDI's continued targeting of Dr. B.L.'s Cambodian refugee patients,
despite Dr. B.L.'s and community advocacy organizations' repeated
attempts to meet with CDI and address their suspicions, 133 suggests
a kind of racial profiling. The cultural and language barriers largely
ignored, and thereby preserved, by SSA's anti-fraud machinery may
serve as proxy for more overt forms of xenophobia.134 Especially
given the highly publicized stories of Cambodian refugee fraud
rings - which, in many ways, contributed to the CDI program's
very creation 1 35 - it is no stretch of the imagination to believe that
the Oakland CDI unit's unprofessional and ferocious four-year
preoccupation with Dr. B.L.'s Cambodian patients reflects
institutional animus. 136
hyperlink; follow "Continue" until arriving at the page titled "Should You Complete
this Report?") (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
132. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
134. See Spun Steak Co., 13 F.3d at 296, 299 (Reinhardt, C.J., dissenting) ("History...
[attests] to the widespread tactic of using language as a surrogate for attacks on ethnic
identity"); id. at 296 (linking the growing popularity of Speak-English-only employment
rules with "anti-immigrant backlash"); DOJ Guidelines, supra note 108, at 50124 (finding
non-English language speakers may trigger "prejudice and xenophobia"); DENNIS
BARON, THE ENGLISH-ONLY QUESTION: AN OFFICIAL LANGUAGE FOR AMERICANS? 190

(Yale University Press 1990) (quoting Rep. Norman Mineta of California stating that
governmental English-only policy would "set up a class of 'outsiders' - unable to
communicate with their government, and their government unable to communicate with
them").
135. See NOSSCR, supra note 96, at 5 (SSA's Director of Disability Process Policy
Division cited Southeast Asian immigrant fraud in California and Washington while
presenting history of CDI).
136. Intentional discrimination on the basis of national origin or alienage is subject to
strict scrutiny.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (invalidating
Pennsylvania's refusal to provide welfare assistance to aliens).
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The Oakland CDI unit's interactions with Cambodian refugees,
and the sensationalized press reports regarding Cambodian refugee
fraud rings, align with a historical disfavor towards immigrants
with disabilities. Beginning in 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act,
immigration law has barred "lunatics, idiots, and persons likely to
become a public charge." 137 Such exclusion formed part of a
"broader picture... in which immigration met the economy's
demand for labor, and immigrants unsuited for labor were
unwelcome." 138 Just so, in 1996, Congress enacted the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA"), which severely restricted legal immigrants' access to
public assistance benefits until they had naturalized or contributed
sufficiently to the American workforce. 139 PRWORA embodies both
an ideology of self-support through labor, which cannot well
accommodate persons with certain severe disabilities, and the antiimmigration fervor that helped pass the Act. 140 One may well
consider the CDI program a sister initiative to the PRWORA, born
from the same GAO reports, the same sensational narratives of
immigrant fraud, and the same animus towards immigrants with
disabilities.
Ultimately, the national origin anti-discrimination paradigm
can provide but little hope to the Cambodian refugee SSI applicants.
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has precluded them from
suing to enforce federal regulations barring disparate impact
discrimination' 4' (standards which SSA has perhaps pointedly
neglected to assume); and on the other, any allegation of
institutional or individual animus would face serious evidentiary
challenges, as the claim is admittedly more suggestive and deeplyfelt than it is demonstrable. Nevertheless, the Social Security
Administration would do well to live up to its aspirations regarding
claimants with limited English proficiency, and pressure OIG to
enforce these standards against its CDI agents.
Just as the
accommodation of language difference can reinforce political
legitimacy, a disregard for linguistic and cultural barriers can
inspire cynicism, alienation, and public contempt 142 - and surely,
Social Security has had enough of that.
137. Mark C. Weber, Opening the Golden Door: Disability and the Law of Immigration, 8 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 153, 156 n.9 (2004).

138. Id. at 161.
139. Id. at 169-70. The restriction affects refugees to a lesser, but not insignificant
extent.
140. Id. at 171-74; see also Polen, supra note 14, at 1463-66; Hing, supra note 14, at 168.
141. See supra note 125.
142. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language and Participation,94 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 729,
750 (2006).
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IV- Disability Discrimination
proves
more
analysis
A
disability
discrimination
accommodating for the refugee applicants, given its incorporation of
disparate impact examination into its standards. This section
evaluates the disadvantages to Cambodian refugees under both the
statutory standards of the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA")
and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), and more theoretical conceptions
of disability discrimination. This Part does not address the state
DDS offices' Eleventh Amendment immunity and its implications
for a potential ADA/RA suit, but certainly this issue is a current
flashpoint in disability discrimination litigation and cannot be
43
disregarded.
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act
A disability discrimination claim against a state Disability
Determination Services agency under the ADA'4 involves three
elements: (1) plaintiff is an individual with a disability, who
qualifies for SSI benefits; (2) DDS denied her SSI application "or
otherwise discriminated against" her, and; (3) the denial or
discrimination was by reason of her disability.145 Similarly, a
disability discrimination claim against the federal Social Security
4
Administration or its Office of Inspector General, under the RA,1 6
involves: a plaintiff with a disability; "otherwise qualified" to
receive SSI; who was denied benefits "solely by reason of" her
disability. 147 The "otherwise qualified" language seems out-of-place
in the present context, considering that one qualifies for SSI by being
disabled. This very dynamic complicates a refugee plaintiff's claim of
facial or intentional discrimination, since she cannot claim that had
143. See generally Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2008) states that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity."
145. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002); Layton v. Elder, 143
F.3d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1998).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2008) provides: "No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
excluded from the participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity.. . conducted by any Executive agency."
147. See Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052; Leslie v. Hee Man Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 52-53 (1st Cir.
2001); Layton, 143 F.3d at 472.
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48
been non-disabled, she would have received SSI benefits.1
Instead of claiming intent-based discrimination, the refugee
plaintiff's claim must turn on the ADA/RA's limited recognition of
disparate impact discrimination.
The Department of Justice
regulations implementing the ADA forbid public entities from using
"criteria or methods of administration" that effectively discriminate
by disability, or "substantially impair" the entity in accomplishing
its objectives with respect to persons with disabilities. 149 While the
Supreme Court has rejected an expansive notion of disparate
impact, it has implicitly adopted a "meaningful access" standard,
such that an "otherwise qualified" plaintiff with a disability may
show discrimination by demonstrating that a policy's disparate
impact denies her "meaningful access" to the program's services.1 50
Plaintiffs may demonstrate disparate impact by pointing to a
policy that employs "eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability" from a program's
services or benefits, unless the criteria form a "necessary element" of
the service. 151 Such criteria include any "test, judgment, or trait that
the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or less likely
of having." 52 Eligibility criteria that screen out a particular
disability, rather than the disabled "as a class," are also
discriminatory, since an agency's "appropriate treatment of some
disabled persons does not permit it to discriminate against other
disabled people." 153 In order to show a cognizable impact, however,
the plaintiff must still satisfy the Court's "meaningful access"
standard.154
Finally, the ADA and the RA oblige agencies to make
"reasonable modifications" to programs, policies, and procedures to
148. See Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1053; see also Leslie, 250 F.3d at 54-55 (holding that a medical
professional's negligent decision to refer a patient with a disability is not discriminatory,
unless the decision is so medically unreasonable as to demonstrate discrimination).
149. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(3)(i)-(ii); see Hunsaker v. Contra Costa County, 149 F.3d
1041, 1042 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the DOJ regulation to a county general assistance
welfare program).
150. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 (1985) (assuming, without deciding, that
the RA "reaches at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon
the handicapped")
151. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8); Hunsaker, 149 F.3d at 1043; Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297,
301-302 (3d Cir. 1994).
152. Choate, 469 U.S. at 302. While Alexander v. Choate predates the DOJ regulation
cited and the ADA itself, at least one court has used the Court's opinion to give content
to this particular regulation. See Hunsaker, 149 F.3d at 1043.
153. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1054; see also Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) ("The effect of [an anti-discrimination]
statute is not to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the
protected class.").
154. Hunsaker, 149 F.3d at 1043.
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avoid disparate impact on persons with disabilities. 155 An agency
need not make modifications that "fundamentally alter" the service
or benefits they provide; for example, a college nursing program
was not required to "substantially lower[]" its standards to admit
and accommodate a hearing-impaired student. 156 At the same time,
the Court has recognized that "situations may arise where a refusal
to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory."1 57 In sum, a disparate impact claim would require
a plaintiff to show that an agency's eligibility criteria deny her
meaningful access to its services, and that the remedy would require
of the agency only reasonable modifications.
Three facets of SSA's anti-fraud machinery have a
discriminatory impact against the case-study refugee applicants by
reason of their disability. First and foremost, the POMS' listed
"fraud triggers" bias DDS analysts and CDI investigators against
Cambodian refugees with PTSD and Depression.158 The fraud
triggers thus constitute eligibility criteria that tend to screen out
these applicants, referring them to often baseless and irresponsible
investigations that seriously prejudice, if not totally preclude, their
initial claim. 59 Even if these refugees find success on appeal, the
uncertainty of such reversals, and the low appeal rates systemwide, 160 indicate that such prejudice at the initial level can deny
applicants "meaningful access" to the entire SSI program.
Second, the CDI units' refusal to adapt their investigative
practices to the claimant's disability may constitute discrimination.
As discussed earlier, CDI agents are not trained psychologists, nor
do they change their tactics according to a subject's alleged
disability.1 61 Their failure to account for disability has serious
constitutional implications regarding law enforcement and
consent, 162 and can create artificial and unnecessary inconsistencies
155. See 28 C.F.R. § 13.130(b)(7).
156. Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 413 (1979).
157. Id. at 412-13.
158. See supra Part II.A.
159. This disparate impact analysis depends on an intersection of disability and
national origin: while the fraud triggers do not necessarily impact Cambodians as a
class, or PTSD-sufferers as a class, they do impact the intersection of these classes. See
Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Comm. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (1980) (finding
"discrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination
against black men or white women").
160. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
161. See supra, Part II.B; Shavelson, supra note 3.
162. See generally Brian S. Love, Beyond Police Conduct: Analyzing Voluntary Consent to
Warrantless Searches by the Mentally Ill and Disabled, 48 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1469 (2004);
Christine Hopkins, Cooperative Disability Investigation Tactics, Fourth Amendment
Consent to Search Doctrine, and the Diminished Sanctity of Social Security Disability
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in the claimant's evidence. 163 Considering CDI's mission to improve
the accuracy of disability determinations, and the wealth of
disability-related resources available to them through state DDS
offices, a CDI agent training program on how to recognize and
interact with PTSD-sufferers is surely a "reasonable modification"
within the ADA and RA. If it "fundamentally alters" the CDI
program, it will do so only in a positive direction, increasing both
the accuracy of CDI evidence and the dignitary experience of
investigated subjects.
Third and most fundamentally, the institutional character of
SSA's anti-fraud machinery, which demands a meticulous
consistency from investigated claimants, discriminates against
claimants with PTSD, Depression, and other impairments involving
memory loss and confusion. CDI agents' and DDS analysts'
equation of minute inconsistencies with poor credibility
perniciously denies meaningful access to the SSI program according
to a "test, judgment or trait" that PTSD sufferers and others are less
likely to meet. The immediate, and immediately appealing answer
to such an assertion is that consistency of evidence is an "essential
prerequisite" in the disability determination process, and especially
in the anti-fraud program. 164 After all, CDI investigators have a
duty to root out fraud in the SSI program: can they really afford to
turn a blind eye to an inconsistent story? To respond to this
admittedly compelling contention, the next section discusses some
theoretical underpinnings of disability and discrimination.
B.

Credibility and the Social Model of Disability

The social model of disability recognizes the functional
disadvantages of persons with disabilities as socially constructed, a
product of an environment built by and designed for a majority that
defines itself as abled. 165 Thus, "[i]f the majority of people, instead
of just a few, wheeled rather than walked, graceful spiral ramps
instead of jarringly angular staircases would connect lower to upper
floors of buildings. " 166 Disability discrimination, therefore, results
Claimants' Homes (2005) (unpublished student note, on file with author).
163. See supra Parts ILA, B.
164. See Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d at 304 (finding a participant's mental alertness to be
an "essential prerequisite" of a state's attendant care program, a modification of which
would fundamentally alter the program).
165. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 74-75 (Anita Silvers et al.,
eds., Rowman & Littlefield 1998); see also CLAIRE LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL

CONSTRUCT (University of Pennsylvania Press 1988).
166. Silvers, supra note 165, at 74.
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not so much from any particular animus, but rather from an
indifference to these majority-constructed disadvantages, and an
inertia to accommodate the differently abled. The Supreme Court
has accordingly noted that Congress perceived "[d]iscrimination
against the handicapped.., to be most often the product, not of
invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference of benign neglect." 167 Moreover, certain societal decisions about the
disabled, most notably, the institutionalization of persons with
mental disabilities, "perpetuate[] unwarranted assumptions that
persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life." 168
Likewise, the equation of consistency of evidence with
credibility of evidence, so ingrained in the state DDS's disability
determinations and CDI's fraud reports, is an "artificial and
remediable" 169 social construct. 170 It is no surprise to find that our
adjudicatory culture, in which cross-examining lawyers impeach a
witness's credibility by extracting inconsistencies from his story, has
constructed the (apparently) consistent, focused, and complete
narrative as the believable one. 171 But for those who deal daily with
persons with mental impairments - who may suffer memory gaps,
poor concentration, or, for that matter, schizophrenic influences and
paranoid delusions - consistency, or even factual accuracy, is not a
particularly useful measure of honesty. Rather, more subjective
standards of genuineness, sincerity, and forthrightness better
determine when a claimant acts with integrity or deceit towards the
system. CDI and DDS analysts should rely on these more nuanced,
accurate indicators for credibility determinations, rather than the
comfortingly objective, but often irrelevant considerations of
consistency.
Given the overtly paternalistic mission of the SSI program to
provide social support for persons with disabilities, it is particularly
perverse to find disability discrimination at work in its policies and
practices. While institutional concerns of welfare fraud are, of
course, compelling, the Social Security Administration must balance
its anti-fraud efforts against the accessibility and legitimacy of its
programs.
167. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295.
168. Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
169. See Silvers, supra note 165, at 74.
170. See also MASHAW, supra note 77, at 131 (DDS analysts' demand for objective
evidence "risks confusing objectivity with reality. Objectivity can be a fetish, and
evidentiary requirements that insist on objective evidence may have unfortunate effects
on outcome.").
171. See Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales:
Toward a Sociology of Narrative, 29 LAW & Soc. REV. 197, 207-08 (1995).
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V. Due Process
Because much of the disadvantage to the case-study refugee
applicants originates in the design and application of the disability
determination procedures, and the procedures of the fraud
investigations that supplement targeted claims, it is worthwhile to
examine these case studies under a due process standard. However,
the traditional model of due process holds little promise for
aggrieved SSI applicants, because this model primarily protects
assertive, procedurally savvy claimants, rather than traumatized
aliens more or less dependent on the government's goodwill.
Nevertheless, a less orthodox due process analysis, concerned with
the substantive fairness of administrative systems, would effectively
address these applicants' grievances without unduly burdening
CDI's investigative discretion or SSA's determination procedures.
Part V.A performs this first, classical due process analysis, while
Part V.B examines the alternative "substantive fairness" approach.
A. Procedural Due Process in its Traditional Form
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect against
deprivations of life, liberty, and property without due process of
law. 172 In analyzing any Due Process-based claim, then, three
questions are relevant: (1) Is there a protected interest at stake?; (2) If
so, has there been a deprivation of this interest?; and (3) If so, what
process must accompany such a deprivation? 173 While the answers
to the first two questions are likely "yes" with regard to Cambodian
refugee SSI claimants, the precedent of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), stands in the way of affording any more procedural
protections to these claimants. However, a truer look at the
interests-balancing of Mathews suggests reevaluation, and reveals
several possible procedural ways to mitigate the claimants'
disadvantage.
1. Protected Interest
To invoke due process protections, a plaintiff must show a
protected interest under the Fifth Amendment: life, liberty, or
property. A protected interest requires more than a mere desire for
a government benefit, but rather a "legitimate claim of entitlement"

172. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV.
173. Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 195 (2001).
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created by state or federal law. 174 In other words, the plaintiff must
have a sufficiently concrete claim, which, if she proves, will oblige
the government to confer that benefit on her. State or federal law
creates a "Roth entitlement" when it restricts the government's
discretion to confer or deny a benefit through specific criteria. For
example, a state law stating specific criteria for granting a prisoner's
175
parole creates a liberty interest invoking due process safeguards.
The Social Security Act creates a Roth entitlement in SSI
benefits, using mandatory language to confer a benefit to eligible
recipients, where eligibility is determined according to extremely
176
specific, regulated criteria of medically determinable disability.
While the Supreme Court has refused to rule whether applicants for
benefits possess a property interest, as recipients facing termination
of benefits do, 177 nearly every federal circuit has ruled that they
do, 178 and there seems no reason why the Roth entitlement's criteria
apply any less to applicants than recipients. Thus, it is exceedingly
likely that denied SSI applicants have a property interest in their
prospective disability benefits.
2. Deprivation
If SSI applicants have a property interest in their benefits, then
an initial denial of benefits suffices as a deprivation of that interest.
Mathews v. Eldridge states that, for courts to obtain jurisdiction over a
constitutional challenge to SSA procedures, the plaintiff need only
174. Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
175. Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1987).
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (2000), ("Every aged, blind, or disabled individual who is
determined... to be eligible... shall... be paid benefits by the Commissioner.")
(emphasis added); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
177. See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986); but see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
87 (1972) (stating "[tihe right to be heard does not depend upon an advance showing
that one will surely prevail at the hearing"); Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. at 381 (parole
applicant has a liberty interest); Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018, 1021 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that "where state law creates
an entitlement to general assistance based on certain substantive conditions, there
similarly results a property interest [for applicants] that warrants at least some
procedural safeguards.").
178. See Raper v. Lucy, 488 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1973); Basciano v. Herkimer, 605
F.2d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 1978); Kelly v. Railroad Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1980);
Mallette v. Arlington County Employees' Supp. Ret. System II, 91 F.3d 630, 632 (4th Cir.
1996); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1278 (7th Cir. 1981); Daniels v. Woodbury County,
742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 1984); Ostlund v. Bobb, 825 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987);
Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Nelson, 872 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989); but see Gregory
v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304, 1308 (Me. 1984); Sumpter v. White Plains Hous.
Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 425 (1972); Zobriscky v. L.A. County, 28 Cal.App.3d 930, 932
(1972).
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present (unsuccessfully) a claim for benefits.1 79 Because the several
appellate levels of administrative review concern themselves with
disability determinations, not constitutional questions, an initial
denial is "sufficiently final" for a plaintiff to make a constitutional
claim.180

3. Mathews v. Eldridge and Due Process
Mathews v. Eldridge has long since ratified the procedural
mechanics of the SSI administrative hearing, and their postdeprivation timing. In Mathews, the Court held the post-deprivation
ALJ appeal to be sufficient process for the termination of Social
Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits. 181 The Court found
the recipient's private interest in benefits less compelling than that
of the general welfare recipient's in Goldberg v. Kelly, 182 since
disability insurance benefits were not based on financial need.
Furthermore, additional process for the SSDI recipient was unlikely
to contribute to error reduction, since termination decisions "turn, in
most cases, upon routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports
by physician specialists," and "the specter of questionable
credibility and veracity is not present." 18 3
The Cambodian refugees' present complaint, however, differs
in several significant ways, which distinguish Mathews v. Eldridge
and favor a pre-deprivation hearing. First, unlike SSDI, SSI is
means-tested,18 4 so that the SSI applicant's financial need will likely
be commensurate to the financial need of a welfare recipient.
Second, when CDI involves itself in an initial disability
determination, this determination will often turn precisely on
questions of credibility; the medical reports themselves are often
impugned, and must be scrutinized more closely. While the
government's interest in limiting administrative costs is as strong as
ever, the first two factors indicate that CDI-targeted SSI applicants
are due more process than currently afforded. The pertinent
question, of course, is what form and extent this process should
take.

179. 424 U.S. at 331-32.
180. Id. at 330.
181. Id. at 349.
182. Id. at 340-41; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring a predeprivation hearing before terminating a general welfare recipient's benefits).
183. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. 42 U.S.C § 1382(a)(1)(2000).
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a. Neutral Decisionmaker
Due process demands a neutral decisionmaker.185 A
decisionmaker need not be legally trained, 186 but she must not
occupy "two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one
partisan and the other judicial." 187 However, the same standards of
neutrality do not apply to agency officials "acting in a prosecutorial
or plaintiff-like capacity." 188 Even a "combination of investigative
and adjudicative functions" does not necessarily create an
"unconstitutional risk of bias." 189 Lastly, "[w]here an initial
determination is made by a party acting in an enforcement capacity,
due process may be satisfied by providing for a neutral adjudicator
to conduct a de novo review."190
Courts are unlikely to find the decisionmakers at the initial
determination stage impermissibly biased. Although DDS analysts
mix prosecutorial and adjudicative roles by referring applicants for
investigation, and later deciding the same applicants' claims, due
process does not recognize an unconstitutional risk of bias in this
role-mixing alone. Though the political and financial implications
of approving even a conjecturally fraudulent claim may create
strong incentives for denial, as may the relative ease of denying a
suspicious claimant over carefully weighing the ROI against
medical evidence, the Court has proved unwilling to recognize these
less tangible institutional incentives, which often depend on far too
cynical a vision of bureaucracy. 191 As for the CDI investigators, due
process requires no higher standard than that they obey the law. 192
b. "Some Kind of Hearing"
Supposing that a court were to order a pre-denial hearing for
CDI-targeted SSI applicants, what form should that hearing take?

185. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
186. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).
187. Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 532, 534 (1927)).
188. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 248.
189. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
190. Concrete Pipe v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 618 (1993)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
191. See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 615-16 (rejecting the suggestion that mental health
professionals who decide whether to admit committed children are susceptible to
"institutional pressure" to admit these children); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (stating that

prior involvement in a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as a
decision maker).
192. See Marshall, 446 U.S. at 249.
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The possible meanings of the Court's "some kind of hearing"
requirement are legion, 193 but the deeply personal nature of the
claimants' protected interest, as discussed below, favors a
'dignitary' approach to process, in which the applicant's meaningful
participation is the critical benchmark. 194
The opportunity to present reasons and evidence, either in
person or in writing, as to why a certain action should or should not
be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. 195 CDIinvestigated applicants should therefore have an opportunity to
answer their ROI with evidence and argument before the analyst
makes an initial determination. The analyst's consideration only of
the CDI's findings, without rebuttal from the applicant, "invites
arbitrariness and error,"1 96 while an applicant's response to an ROI
contributes both to the analyst's development of the case, and the
applicant's participation in the process.
A fraud investigation likely necessitates an oral hearing, in
which an applicant may respond to the ROI in a face-to-face meeting
with the person deciding her case. 197 In Califano v. Yamasaki, the
importance of 'fault' determination required a predeprivation oral
hearing:
We do not see how [fault] can be evaluated absent personal
contact between the recipient and the person who decides his
case. ... [W]ritten submissions are a particularly inappropriate
way to distinguish a genuine hard luck story from a fabricated tall
tale. 198

Most of the time, neither the DDS analyst who makes an initial
determination, nor the medical expert who evaluates the evidence,

193. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974); see also Henry J. Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1975).
194. See generallyJerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:The Quest for a Dignitary
Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981); see also Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242 (stating a central
concern of procedural due process to be "the promotion of participation and dialogue by
affected individuals in the decisionmaking process").
195. Cleveland Bd. Of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); accord Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (plaintiffs had due process right to contest their status as
non-residents for purposes of in-state tuition).
196. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 424 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
197. While the administrative hearing provides such an opportunity, this section
assumes some form of pre-deprivation hearing, before an SSA analyst makes an initial
determination.
198. 442 U.S. 682, 697 (1979); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 607 (finding that, where
parents seek to institutionalize a child, the decisionmaker must "of course" personally
evaluate the child first).
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has any personal contact with the applicant. 199

Califano indicates

that, where the applicant's credibility is in question, such distance is
improper.
Although

the

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

"where

governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the
reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence

used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the
20 0
individual so he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue,"

currently, SSI applicants investigated for fraud see their ROI only
after their analyst's initial decision. 201 Because the evidence is
disclosed after the initial decision, any "opportunity" to prove such
evidence is untrue does not appear to exist in practice. A predeprivation hearing would necessarily require that SSA disclose
ROIs and other adverse evidence to the applicant, so that she may
meaningfully rebut them.

CDI-investigated applicants may also be entitled to counsel,
though not necessarily legal counsel. Vitek v. Jones held that, where

authorities believe a prisoner to suffer a mental disorder requiring
involuntary treatment, it is "appropriate" to provide counsel for the

prisoner's hearing, since "such a prisoner is more likely to be unable
to understand or exercise his rights." 202 Likewise, traumatized
refugees with limited English will less likely be able to exercise their
rights, assert their cases against state medical experts' testimony,

and defend themselves against the threat of fraud prosecution and
deportation. 203

However, the Court has often rejected a duty to

provide counsel in "non-adversarial" hearings, in an effort to
199. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
200. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (finding government contractor
deprived of his security clearance for alleged Communist sympathies had a right to see
evidence against him).
201. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN, OFF. OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REV., HEARINGS,
APPEAL AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL ("HALLEX") 1-1-5-15, 1-2-1-35, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OPHome/hallex (providing guidelines for ALJs at the
administrative appellate level). See also Matt Greenbaum & Charles E. Binder, A Few
Ideas on How to Handle an OIG Investigation of a Worthy Disability Claim, NATIONAL SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY LAW CONFERENCE 73, 75 (Oct. 2002) ("The OIG has a reputation for
making sure the [investigated claimant's] representative gets a copy of the [ROI] on the
day of the hearing.").
202. 445 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1980) (plurality opinion). Justice Powell wrote separately to
state that Jones's appointed assistance need not be legal, but only competent and
independent, acting in the prisoner's sole interest. Id. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring in
part).
203. Cf. Lassiter v. Dep't Soc. Ser., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (finding an indigent
mother in parental rights hearing did not have right to appointed counsel because she
was not threatened with deprivation of liberty through criminal prosecution, no expert
witnesses were involved, and appointed counsel would likely not have made a
determinative difference).
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preserve the "informality" of these hearings. 2 4 But where
government agents have challenged an applicant's credibility, and
exposed the applicant to fines or even deportation, the "nonadversarial" quality of the hearing becomes illusory.
These procedural mechanisms (notice, oral hearing, right to
counsel), and their more adversarial cousins (such as crossexamination) have only limited relevance to SSI applicants. An
informally educated refugee with sparse English will extract limited
benefit from reviewing his ROI, or from his right to rebut its
findings before the analyst. 205 More importantly, a PTSD sufferer
will have a psychological aversion to discussing his traumatic
experiences, 206 which may prevent her from presenting an adequate
response to CDI's conclusions. Although SSA-provided translators
and claimant representatives may mitigate some of these difficulties,
the administrative cost of the aforementioned protections may
increase the already substantial processing time for applications,
and may result in underfunded, compromised, or sub-standard
services.
Moreover, the paradigm of more-is-better hearing procedures is
likely inappropriate for the SSI program.
These procedural
mechanisms advantage assertive and resourceful litigants, while the
SSI program's mission is overtly paternalistic and (albeit
circumspectly) protective. 207 Shifting the protective role to counsel,
or to empowering procedural mechanisms, subtly suggests that the
applicants or their representatives, not the Government, have the
responsibility to protect their rights. 208 These procedural
mechanisms also risk creating an "externally-oriented" agency
culture, more concerned with guessing what mechanism a future
court may or may not require than providing substantive justice to
applicants. 209
B.

Substantive Fairness as Due Process

Rather than adding procedural mechanisms to an already
highly regulated system, courts should concern themselves with
how well the current mechanisms provide substantive fairness.
204. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 324; Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 270-71; Friendly, supra note 193, at 1287-90.
205. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and
Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of
Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772, 788-90 (1974).
206. DSM-IV, supra note 63, at 428.
207. Mashaw, supra note 205, at 780-82.
208. See id. at 782-83.
209. MASHAW, supranote 77, at 9.
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Surely, due process encompasses not just the sufficiency of process,
210
but the competent administration of process as well.
A quick examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the SSI
claimant's so-called property interest confirms that the substantive
fairness of process is indeed the true prize here. Professor Van
Alstyne has claimed that the Supreme Court's protection of
government-dispensed benefits as property interests, based on
Professor Reich's "new property"

thesis,

211

was a misdirected

212
pretext to get a "constitutional handle" on unfair agency actions.
In order to invoke due process protections, Van Alstyne argues,
213
courts gave novel, peculiar content to the property interest,
content which eventually stabilized as the Roth entitlement. For SSI
applicants, the terms "property" and "entitlement" are legal fictions:
an applicant does not "own" anything, and has no guarantee of
receiving benefits. Rather, the Roth entitlement, by invoking due
process protections, fulfills a "promise-keeping" function: it is "an
assurance that government will employ a decisionmaking protocol
reasonably likely to yield correct application of the legally relevant
substantive criteria." 214 The refugee applicants' complaint, then, has
less to do with protecting property, and everything to do with
fairness.

1. Administrative Consistency as Due Process
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") as well as commonlaw doctrines of administrative duty prohibit agencies from acting
arbitrarily or capriciously, and obligate agencies to follow their own
promulgated rules. 215 In his dissent to United States v. Caceres,
210. While the administration of process is arguably a subject "committed to agency
discretion by law," and thus unreviewable by courts under the APA, see Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985), this standard does not preclude courts from examining
the same subject constitutionally under the Due Process Clause, see Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 603 (1988).
211. In 1964, Reich argued that government-conferred wealth, from public contracts
to welfare benefits, had become so vital to modern citizenry that it should be
surrounded with the same legal protections as real property. See generally Charles Reich,
The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
212. William Van Alstyne, Cracks in "the New Property":Adjudicative Due Process in the
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 484 (1976).
213. Id. at 456-57.
214. Cynthia Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform": Procedural Due Process
and the New Welfare Act, 40 ADMIN L. REV. 591, 622 (1998).
215. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2008); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 753-54 (1979); Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232, 235 (1974); Gardner v. Fed'l Comm. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 1086,
1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739,
748 (2004) (agencies must follow their regulations over internal manuals or longstanding
practice); Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 758 F.2d
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Justice Marshall argued that the Due Process Clause itself requires
an agency to adhere to its own rules and standards. 216 Justice
Marshall noted that several landmark decisions upholding this
principle were based on due process, 217 and recognized the
government's protective responsibility, under the Due Process
218
Clause, to ensure that its agencies act legitimately.
While Justice Marshall's conception of administrative
consistency and legitimacy as a due process concern met with little
support, the Court has stated that an agency's violation of its own
rules raises due process issues when the plaintiff was "entitled to
rely" on the violated rule, 219 the plaintiff is under investigation, 220 or
221
the agency rule was designed to safeguard the plaintiff.
Specifically, due process requires that agencies, in prosecuting
penalties against individuals, must follow their own rules of
evidence and base these penalties on reliable, legitimate evidence. 222
Due process also forbids agencies from "entrapping" individuals by
penalizing them for actions taken consistently with the agency's
rules. 223 However, non-obvious agency errors do not raise
constitutional issues.224
Under these principles, CDI investigators and DDS analysts
must scrupulously follow SSA's promulgated regulations, and
possibly the standards set in the POMS. Specifically, DDS analysts
must follow the rules of evidence, which give controlling weight to
the claimant's credible treating sources. 225 While it may be unwise
to restrict the scope of the evidence that CDI agents may report in
the ROIs, it is imperative that the agents or some other SSA official
evaluate this evidence consistent with SSA's standards of disability
and evidentiary weight, and incorporate such an analysis into the
ROI. 226
Moreover, CDI agents must acknowledge that SSI
708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1985); but see supra note 27 (POMS does not bind Social Security
Administration).
216. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 758, 764 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
217. E.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. at 205, 235, 236; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153,
154 (1945); see Caceres, 440 U.S. at 758 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. See Caceres, 440 U.S. at 762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 752-53 (opinion of the Court); but see Gardner, 530 F.2d at 1090 (publishing
rules creates a "reasonable expectation" that agency will follow such rules).
220. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 152, 153.
221. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 759.
222. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 154, 156; see also id. at 159 (" [T]he more liberal the practice in
admitting testimony, the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules
of evidence.") (quoting ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 (1913)).
223. See Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571, 574 (1965).
224. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 752.
225. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.B. Although OIG and its sub-entities enjoy broad statutory
discretion in their investigations, see OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 20, at ii, the SSA
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paperwork and forms, by limiting the claimant's response options,
may be responsible for many of the "inconsistencies" they cite so
insinuatingly. 227 To do otherwise might very well constitute the
agency "entrapment" described and prohibited by the Court.
Finally, CDI agents must take care to follow SSA's rules on
providing translators, even and especially when they doubt
claimants' limited English proficiency. 228
2. "BureaucraticJustice" as Due Process
In his 1983 study of SSI and SSDI disability determinations,
Professor Mashaw measured the Social Security Administration
against an administrative ideology of bureaucratic rationality, which
prioritizes an accurate and transparent execution of legislative
will. 229 SSA mostly follows the rational model, as it creates
transparent guidelines finely tuned to carry out congressional
objectives. 230 However, the CDI program, at least with respect to
the case-study Cambodian refugee SSI applicants, falls miserably
short. The case-study ROIs are not bureaucratically rational, as they
disregard congressional and SSA's evaluative standards of
disability, 231 present biased and superficial evidence riddled with
cultural and ability-related inaccuracies, 232 and appear to
circumvent SSA's rules of evidence-weighing. 233 Systemwide,
administrative law judges have expressed concern over the hearsay
and out-of-context observations contained in the ROIs. 234
Mashaw suggested an approach to substantive administrative
fairness based on bureaucratic rationality, in which an internal
Quality Assurance program, rather than external judicial
interventions and claimant-driven procedural mechanisms, monitor
and correct the agency's performance. 235 In order to preserve
beneficial agency discretion, he distinguishes between clear errors
and "poor exercises of discretion," where an agency official's
actions, while not clearly the wrong choice, are clearly not the right
Commissioner's promulgated rules provide binding legal standards against which a
court may review CDI agents' actions. See Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v.
Baldrige, 827 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1987); Cal. Human Dev. Corp. v. Brock, 762 F.2d
1044, 1049 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
227. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 131.
228. See supra Part IIA; Part III.A.
229. MASHAW, supra note 77, at 25.
230. Id. at 35.
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Part I.D.2.
233. See supra Part II.B.
234. OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 20, at 9.
235. See generally Mashaw, supra note 205, at 776-804.
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choice either. 236 Such a program's success depends in part on its
ability to engineer an agency culture with clear normative
standards. 237 These norms are especially difficult to engineer in the
SSI program, as Congress and Commissioners alike have stressed
competing goals of benevolence and fiscal conservatism. 238
Such a distinction well describes the dilemma of evaluating the
Oakland CDI unit and its ROIs. Given past examples of translator
fraud and refugee fraud rings, as well as the importance of
protecting the SSI program against exploitation, one cannot rightly
say that CDI agents clearly erred or abused their discretion in
investigating the case-study claimants, or collecting the evidence
they did. Rather, one may say that CDI agents have exercised their
discretion less than optimally, to the detriment of these applicants
and the accurate determination of their claims. A Quality Assurance
monitoring and feedback program, applied to CDI, would preserve
the agents' discretion to investigate fraud effectively, while
improving these investigations' accuracy, judgment, and treatment
of claimants. While the normative goals of such a CDI program investigating fraud and protecting claimants - are indeed
competing, they are not irreconcilable, as law enforcement agencies
in general must bridge these goals daily.
Though nontraditional, the judicial imposition of a quality
assurance program would be both reasonable and effective as a due
process remedy. 239 As Mashaw argues, the "realistic prospects" of
traditional procedural protections should affect a court's evaluation
of what due process requires of social welfare programs. 240 The
existence of a sound quality assurance program necessarily plays
into such an evaluation. 241 Moreover, Goldberg v. Kelly directs courts
to tailor due process to the agency's context and the claimant's
capabilities. 242 Thus, "when due process cannot be assured by trialtype hearings, additional or different techniques for assuring

236. MASHAW, supra note 77, at 150.
237. Id. at 156, 159.
238. Id. at 159-60.
239. But see Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32 (finding agency decisions not to bring
enforcement actions presumptively unreviewable). Heckler interpreted broadly, may
preclude courts from reviewing (under the APA) an agency's decision not to impose
intra-agency enforcement mechanisms on its programs and personnel. See id. (noting
agencies' particular expertise to evaluate such multivariate decisions). But Heckler does
not in itself bar judicial remedies calling for greater enforcement, however implicitly it
may discourage them; more importantly, the reviewability standards of the APA do not
apply to due process inquiries. See supra note 210.
240. Mashaw, supra note 205, at 810.
241. Id. at 807.
242. 397 U.S. at 267.
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fairness become appropriate." 243 Given the SSI program's explicitly
paternalistic mandate, and the vulnerability and functional
limitations of SSI claimants, internal quality assurance measures are
a sensible and attractive remedy.
Finally, the judicial imposition of a quality assurance program
as a due process remedy may prove less of an intrusion into
legislative and administrative authority than the imposition of more
traditional, judicially delineated hearing requirements. 244 Indeed,
such a management-based approach evaluates "what process is due
the social welfare claimant in the social welfare system's own
5
terms." 24
Policy Proposal and Conclusion
The Social Security Administration and its Inspector General
have available numerous feasible and cost-contained remedies
against the ongoing violations detailed above. These remedies
strike a meaningful balance between the peremptory norms of antidiscrimination and due process and the government's duty to
protect its social welfare programs against fraud.
First and foremost, the Office of the Inspector General should
train CDI agents to interact constructively and responsibly with
persons with disabilities and culturally isolated individuals.
Trained, professional CDI agents are essential to an anti-fraud
program that not only respects applicants' rights and dignities, but
also reports the most accurate evidence to disability analysts.
Reports of Investigations should present evidence neutrally, without
over-emphasizing minor inconsistencies or slanting ambiguous facts
as suspicious, and discuss the evidence in the context of the
applicant's linguistic or cultural limitations and claimed disability.
This process would still supply analysts with all the evidence
gathered, but in a manner more consistent with Social Security's
mission to assist the most vulnerable populations. The Inspector
General should further develop a Quality Assurance program to
monitor, scrutinize, and adjust the practices of CDI units to ensure
that they investigate claimants fairly, rationally, and responsibly.
Given that there are currently only nineteen CDI units in the
nation, 246 and given the Social Security Administration's own
243. Mashaw, supra note 205, at 810.
244. Id. at 816. One may even, similar to the plaintiffs in Lau v. Nichols, ask a court to
declare the current situation a violation of due process, and compel the Social Security
Administration to "'applyits expertise" in addressing this violation. See 414 U.S. at 565.
245. Id. at 824.
246. OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
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elaborate Quality Assurance program, 247 the costs of training and
monitoring the CDI units should fall well within fiscal constraints.
Similarly, the Social Security Administration should train and
monitor state Disability Determination Services analysts to account
for culture and ability in evaluating CDI Reports of Investigation
Such training and
and deciding the credibility of evidence.
enforcement would add much-needed operational content to the
POMS's ambiguous, and highly discretionary guidelines. This
would also prevent unanticipated cultural traits - such as a large
refugee family afflicted with PTSD - from unfairly triggering fraud
investigations, or linguistic and ability-related impairments from
creating artificial but prejudicial inconsistencies in the record.
Again, because SSA already trains and monitors state analysts on a
multitude of other concerns, 248 the cost to the agency would be
minimal, while the benefit to applicants would be great.
The Social Security Administration should also revise its fraud
triggers to account for mental health providers who specialize in
certain impairments and to provide mechanisms by which flagged
providers may exonerate themselves. Not only will this protect
specialists and the patients they serve, but it will also save CDI units
considerable opportunity costs in pursuing false leads, as the
Oakland CDI unit has done with Dr. B.L. and her patients for the
past five years. Finally, SSA must ensure that the tests employed by
CDI agents and Consultative Examiners translate effectively to other
cultures. Discrimination aside, simple prudence demands that the
agency rely on tests that are as accurate as possible. Again, this will
further CDI's investigative mission as much as it protects claimants
from agency error.
The main cost associated with these measures is not the expense
of implementation, but rather the cost of correcting false positives.
For every initial claim denied due to an unfavorable Report of
Investigation, the Social Security Administration saves an estimated
$66,500.249 The measures proposed above do nothing to correct false
negatives; thus, CDI's improved accuracy would necessarily lead to
approved claims that would otherwise have been denied, though
denied inappropriately. However, this author is not yet so cynical
as to think Social Security would countenance gross inaccuracy and
unfairness to retain money from qualified claimants.
Given the doctrinal
limitations of national
origin
discrimination, disability discrimination, and due process, 250 as well
247.
248.
249.
250.

See generally Mashaw, supra note 205, at 791-804.
Id.
OIG AUDIT REPORT, supra note 20, at 2 n.5.
See, e.g., supra notes and text accompanying notes 121, 125, 127, 147, 181.
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as the ancillary barriers attached to any potential litigation based on
these theories, 251 it may prove more worthwhile for the aggrieved
refugee applicants to seek relief through political channels rather
than through the courts. 252 Yet the disadvantages of litigation
should not mislead one to think the Social Security Administration,
its Cooperative Disability Investigations program, and state
Disability Determination Services have not violated the legal norms
represented in these three causes of action. The Social Security
Administration may well find that, liability in court aside, it must
ensure that its programs maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the
public, and particularly, the public's representatives. Assuring the
accessibility of the Supplemental Security Income program, and the
fairness and responsibility of its anti-fraud efforts, is thus well
worth these modest but vital measures.

251. See, e.g., supra notes and text accompanying notes 127, 142, 177, 210.
252. See MASHAW, supra note 77, at 189 (discussing ineffectiveness of judicial
intervention).

